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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis utilizes a reproductive justice framework to discuss the impact of anti-
abortion legislation and the anti-abortion movement on women of color and low-income women, 
arguing that reduced access to abortion is oppressive to minority women. Chapter 1 outlines the 
theoretical framework of this thesis, focusing on feminist Marxism, Intersectionality, Critical 
Race Theory, and radical and third wave feminist perspectives. Chapter 2 provides an overview 
of the anti-abortion movement and the major state and federal laws and court cases that have 
defined women’s access to abortion in the United States, including Roe v Wade, the Hyde 
Amendment, Planned Parenthood v Casey, and TRAP laws. Chapter 3 discusses the oppressive 
effects of these laws by connecting anti-abortion legislation and the anti-abortion movement to 
larger historical systems of oppression and examining the effect of reduced access to abortion on 
women’s reproductive choices and socioeconomic status. This chapter argues that reduced access 
to abortion is oppressive because it encourages sterilization among minority women who may 
have chosen other birth control options given the choice, and funnels minority women into an 
oppressive and exploitative US welfare system. Chapter 4 discusses minority women’s potential 
to overcome this oppression and examines some real-world examples of reproductive rights 
activism. This thesis expands the current discussion on abortion access by centering the 
discussion on minority women and arguing that reduced access to abortion is systematically 
oppressive rather than simply discriminatory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Guttmacher Institute classifies both Alabama and Louisiana as hostile to abortion 
(State Abortion Policy Landscape 2019) because they limit abortion access for low-income 
women in a manner that also frequently discriminates against women of color. For example, in 
June 2019, a Jefferson County grand jury in Alabama indicted 28-year old Marshae Jones for the 
manslaughter of her unborn fetus (Brown 2019). While pregnant, Jones instigated an argument 
which led to the death of her fetus and supposedly justified the charge of manslaughter put 
against her (Brown 2019). A conviction could have subjected her to up to 20 years in prison 
(Simon & Scutty 2019). Luckily, an Alabama district attorney dismissed the charges (Brown 
2019). In Louisiana a woman named Dominique was still $30 short for her abortion, despite 
using all her savings, picking up extra shifts at work, and getting financial assistance from her 
abortion clinic (Shah 2019). Because both Alabama and Louisiana are hostile to abortion, 
Marshae Jones’ and Dominique’s predicaments are, unfortunately, not surprising.  
Louisiana and Alabama are not alone in their hostility toward abortion. Abortion is 
consistently a contentious issue in US political debates. In the first half of 2019, 19 states passed 
58 abortion restrictions and 12 states passed an abortion ban, 5 of which banned abortion at 6 
weeks gestational age (Nash, Mohammed, Capello, Naide, & Ansari-Thomas 2019). Many 
contextual factors likely contribute to these bans, however limits to abortion access are not new 
and have increased across states since the passage of the Hyde Amendment in 1976. Scholars 
note that reduced access to abortion disproportionately affects women of color and low-income 
women (see Gerber Fried 1998, Ross 1998, and Shaw 2016). Scholars often focus on the impact 
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of the Hyde Amendment on low-income women because it is one of the clearest examples of 
how reduced access to abortion has a disproportionate effect on a disadvantaged group. More 
recent work incorporates race, arguing that the cumulative effect of several decades of anti-
abortion legislation disproportionately impacts women of color because of systemic issues of 
institutional racism that lead to poverty and poor sex education for minority women. However, 
important questions remain unexplored. For example, what are broader, negative consequences 
of reduced access to abortion on minority women? How are these consequences different for 
white women or women with higher incomes?  
In this thesis, I use a reproductive justice framework to understand the effect of anti-
abortion legislation on minority women. Within this framework, I employ several different 
theories that structure my research and conclusions including third-wave feminist and Marxist 
theories of oppression and privilege, Critical Race Theory, and Intersectionality. I examine the 
history of the anti-abortion movement and argue that it influences politics and political opinion 
such that subsequent anti-abortion legislation has racialized effects. I then argue that those 
effects constitute oppression and point to three specific sites of oppression to support that claim. 
Thus, this thesis argues that reduced access to abortion is a form of reproductive oppression 
affecting women of color and low-income women. This introduction briefly defines and 
discusses reproductive oppression and summarizes the following chapters’ main points.  
In this thesis I argue that reduced abortion access is a form of reproductive oppression 
that disproportionately and negatively impacts women of color and low-income women. 
Reproductive oppression describes “‘the controlling and exploiting of women, girls, and 
individuals through our bodies, sexuality, labor, and reproduction (both biological and social) by 
families, communities, institutions and society’” (Manes 2017 para. 3) and is frequently 
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associated with larger systems of oppression such as slavery and population control (Soomer 
2000, Mass 1977). I argue that reduced access to abortion is a form of social control that reduces 
women of color and low-income women’s reproductive autonomy and exploits their labor. Thus, 
I build on existing literature by arguing that reduced access to abortion constitutes reproductive 
oppression for minority women and low-income women. 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
 In Chapter 1 I discuss the theoretical framework for this thesis. I argue that it is necessary 
to incorporate multiple frameworks given the multifaceted nature of reproductive oppression, 
therefore the first chapter centers on four different theories. First, I discuss feminist perspectives 
on oppression and privilege to help me examine intersecting dynamics of power. Second, I rely 
on Marxist feminism to motivate my argument that reduced access to abortion contributes to the 
exploitation of low-income women of color’s labor. Third, I incorporate Critical Race Theory in 
order to examine institutionalized racism, which is the systematic suppression and exploitation of 
people of color via institutions such as global capitalism, political structures, and mass media 
(Collins 2004). Finally, I discuss Intersectionality as an important way to understand the ways 
individuals comprised of multiple disadvantaged social identities face overlapping systems of 
social inequality.  
 I apply this theory to examine whether reduced access to abortion disproportionately 
affects women of color and low-income women in Chapter 2. I provide an overview of the anti-
abortion movement and argue there is a connection between this movement and racist 
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movements in the US. I build on this by outlining several pieces of important anti-abortion 
legislation and present my argument that these examples of abortion-related legislation are most 
likely to impact minority women and low-income women. I support this argument by examining 
population demographics of abortion hostile states, demographic disparities in abortion rates, and 
observed impacts of reduced access to abortion. I conclude that anti-abortion laws negatively 
affect minority women and low-income women by drawing on Intersectionality and Critical 
Race Theory which focus on how power structures impact individuals (as opposed to other 
theories which blame individuals for their misfortunes).   
 Chapter 3 presents my argument that limits to abortion access constitute a form of 
oppression for women of color and low-income women. I include three major sites of study – 
political connection to broader forms of oppression, reduced reproductive autonomy, and 
economic exploitation – which I argue constitute reproductive oppression. First, scholars tie 
reproductive oppression to broader, historic systems of oppression such as slavery and 
colonization. I argue that the limited attention to women’s reproductive health – specifically, 
abortion access – is a shortcoming of the existing literature and therefore examine ways in which 
anti-abortion legislation and reduced access to abortion connect to current systems of broader 
oppression. Specifically, I focus on the War on Drugs and militaristic anti-immigration 
enforcement at the border between the US and Mexico because, I argue, these are two important 
sites of oppression that influence the political and social world we live in today. This allows me 
to examine my argument that reduced access to abortion and anti-abortion legislation are forms 
of reproductive oppression. I then examine the relationship between abortion access and the rates 
of sterilization and sterilization regret among women of color. Finally, I suggest that low-income 
women, who are disproportionately women of color, face a double bind (Frye 1983) when 
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deciding whether to get an abortion. They can either spend a lot of money for a procedure and 
risk missing a monthly payment or have the child and enter into a family welfare system that 
exploits their labor and restricts their chances for economic advancement.  
 Chapter 4 concludes this thesis by addressing an objection and discussing spaces for 
resistance to this system of reproductive oppression. Some point to Margaret Sanger and the 
historic connection between birth control and eugenics to argue that abortion is a form of racist 
population control carried out by white liberals (Ross 1998, and Dehlendorf, Harris & Weitz 
2013). Those who adopt this view interpret restricting access to abortion as “freeing” for women 
of color. I disagree and argue that increasing access is not the same thing as coercion and 
population control. Women of color are, and have historically been, central actors in the fight for 
reproductive justice and abortion access, so I conclude my thesis by focusing on examples of 
how women at the margins are fighting to increase abortion access. 
 The negative impact of current abortion restrictions demands a closer examination of the 
origins of anti-abortion legislation and the potential effects of that legislation on women of color 
and low-income women. Therefore, I use a reproductive justice framework to examine the 
current and historical state of abortion access. I explore three major sites of study – historical and 
contemporary connections to broader systems of oppression, connections to sterilization abuse, 
and relationship with poverty – to understand the effect of reduced abortion access on minority 
women and low-income women, and conclude that reduced access to abortion is a form of 
reproductive oppression for women of color and low-income women. Despite the difficulties 
reduced access to abortion places in front of these women, they are not completely 
disempowered; indeed, they are uniquely placed to come up with creative solutions to the issues 
that they are confronted with to achieve reproductive justice.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
This thesis uses multiple theoretical frameworks to argue that lack of access to abortion is 
oppressive to low-income women and women of color by limiting their choices for birth control 
and reproductive autonomy, thereby encouraging sterilization and trapping them in poverty. 
Studying abortion access is one important avenue towards a broader examination of the 
oppression of low-income women and women of color. Reproductive oppression is historically 
tied to broader systems of oppression, and reduced access to abortion is a current expression of 
that pattern. Lack of access to abortion is oppressive to low-income women and minority women 
and these limitations affect them more harshly than higher-income women, particularly higher-
income white women (Gerber Fried 2000, Shaw 2016). Reducing access to abortion forces low-
income and minority women towards more extreme forms of birth control such as sterilization, 
contributes to these women being in poverty by trapping them in exploitative family welfare, and 
is a current manifestation of the long history of reproductive oppression.  
It is necessary to present my theoretical motivation so that my argument about the 
complex ways this oppression disproportionately impacts low-income women and minority 
women, specifically, is clear. First, I employ third-wave feminist perspectives on oppression and 
its converse privilege in order to clarify the dynamics of power that have created the current 
system of reproductive oppression. Second, I discuss theories of economic oppression. Here, I 
employ feminist interpretations of Marxism to demonstrate how the reproductive oppression of 
women is connected to larger systems of economic inequality and the exploitation of the working 
class. Third, I discuss critical race theory to explain how systems of racism are institutionalized. 
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Finally, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of intersectionality, which explains how 
intersecting identities can confer oppressions and privileges.  
 I begin with a general theory of oppression. Radical and third wave feminist theories are 
useful here because they often center on examining multiple oppressions with a specific 
emphasis on gender and race. Marilyn Frye (1983) argues that oppression imposes barriers and 
forces that are systematically related and inhibit certain groups of people from moving freely in 
society. She stresses that it is important to look at these systems from a macroscopic level, 
comparing oppression to a birdcage; if one examines just one bar of the birdcage it seems 
obvious that the bird could just fly around the bar, but looking at the whole birdcage it becomes 
apparent that the bird is trapped by multiple barriers that are systematically linked (p. 4-5). This 
creates an experience of oppression that is characterized by the feeling of being in a double bind 
(p. 2). Bailey (1998) expands on this by arguing that for many women the bind is more than 
double due to their intersecting identities, and that “the strength of the bind depends upon which 
of these oppressive conditions are present in a person’s life, how many conditions are present, 
how long they are present, and whether the individual is privileged in ways that might weaken or 
mediate the binds” (p. 106).  
I argue that lack of access to abortion is oppressive in this sense for low-income women 
and women of color – it places this group in a double (and often triple or more) bind wherein 
they have few options both for their reproductive health and for their economic wellbeing. For 
example, I argue that low-income women who are unable to obtain an abortion due to reduced 
access are funneled into family welfare where they are then frequently exploited and unable to 
advance economically. Additionally, reduced access to abortion for many women of color, 
combined with reduced access to other kinds of birth control, reduces their options for birth 
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control in a manner that forces them to choose between two “extremes” – potentially becoming 
pregnant, or entirely ridding themselves of their reproductive abilities. Because of this double-
bind I argue that restricting access to abortion is a key aspect of the systematic oppression of 
minority women. Finally, I tentatively suggest that if lack of access to abortion is a key aspect of 
systematic oppression, perhaps gaining access to abortion could be the key to reducing the 
oppression of low-income women and women of color. In other words, gaining abortion access 
could unlock the birdcage that traps this group.  
Oppression does not exist by itself, so I discuss it in terms that include its converse, 
privilege. Bailey (1998) describes privilege as “unearned advantages or assets conferred 
systematically” (p.110). The words “unearned” and “systematic” are important to stress here. 
Privilege is the result of structural and systematic advantages granted by society and can “exist” 
within characteristics such as the family one is born into, or being white, male, or upper-class 
(Matthews 2013). Society systematically rewards people that hold these identities by giving them 
advantages or removing barriers from their path (Bailey 1998). For example, it is possible for 
those who are not privileged to gain a college education, however it is much easier for someone 
who is privileged (perhaps through their financial stability or social connections) to go to college 
(Matthews 2013). Many note that these gains often occur with limited “hard” work on the part of 
the privileged individual as the advantages are woven into the systems that make up our society 
and confer systematically.  
In addition, people are often oblivious to their own privilege. Peggy McIntosh (1988) 
describes it as an “invisible weightless knapsack of special provisions” and notes that she 
consistently forgot each of the ways she is privileged until she wrote them down (p. 87, 89). 
Another useful analogy that reveals the invisibleness of privilege is Jona Olsson’s comparison of 
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privilege to a user-friendly word processing program (Bailey 1998). Just as the word processor 
does most of the work of making the document look professional, making it easier for the user to 
succeed in presenting themselves and their work in a good light, so too does privilege make it 
easier for, say, white, upper-class men to succeed in life. Both are created to be difficult to see 
by others and by the person immediately affected.  
Those who are privileged reinforce their privilege by creating categories of being that are 
less privileged. The idea that privilege is created is important to stress because it has greater 
connotations; privilege is created by society and with it comes the power to create other 
categories (Bailey 1998). For example, Bailey describes how white men in power introduced the 
distinction between white people and black people into 17th century America to define who had 
rights and benefits in society (1998 p.107). Today, political arguments over which bathroom 
transgender people should use or if they should be allowed to work in the military demonstrate 
how those who hold cisgender privilege are creating categories of people who are deemed unfit 
for the allocation of certain rights and benefits. I argue that reducing access to abortion for low-
income women and women of color is a process implemented in the United States by primarily 
privileged groups, such as upper-class white Christian men and women, that helps maintain their 
own privilege through oppression, while systematically disadvantaging low-income women of 
color. These examples demonstrate the relationship between privilege and oppression; both 
involve unearned assets or barriers that are systematically related and imposed on certain 
categories of person, but one has the power to create and control those categories while the other 
must work inside the confines of the category created by the first.  
I build on these third-wave feminist theories of oppression and privilege with other 
theories of oppression that specifically factor in economics and race. The above theories provide 
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necessary tools to discuss oppression in general, however they lack discussion on the specifics of 
oppression, namely, race and class oppression. First, I address class oppression through the lens 
of feminist, intersectional Marxism. Shahrzad and Carpenter (2019) argue that social relations 
such as race, gender, class, etc. are integral aspects to the rise and success of the capitalist mode 
of production (p. 278). In other words, the capitalist system exploits social identities and 
relations by creating meanings for those identities that benefit those in power (Shahrzad and 
Carpenter 2019). Nicole Rousseau (2009) concurs, specifically arguing that black women and 
their reproduction have historically been manipulated to fulfill the labor needs of the economy. 
In other words, black women’s labor and reproduction have been commodified depending on the 
shifting needs of the US economy ever since the time of slavery (Rousseau 2009).  
These ideas are useful because they illuminate how control of women’s reproduction can 
confine women to lower socioeconomic statuses and thus act as an oppressive force. Many 
scholars agree that much, including economic stability, is at stake for women when deciding 
whether to get an abortion (Rhodes 2014). I concur, arguing that reducing access to abortion 
disproportionately affects low-income women and women of color and is oppressive to that 
group in part because the cost of such scarce abortion, or alternatively the cost of raising children 
within the US welfare system, make it incredibly difficult for these women to escape poverty. In 
this position they are exploited for their labor which often takes the form of low-paid 
reproductive labor such as cooking, cleaning, or child or elder care (Glenn 1990). In other words, 
privileged elites control the reproduction of low-income women of color such that they are 
trapped in poverty and are only able to trade their reproductive labor for survival.  
 I employ critical race theory (CRT) in this analysis to demonstrate the ways in which 
racism is rooted in historical contexts and institutions. This bolsters my argument that the 
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reproductive oppression of women of color is rooted in history and in today’s institutions such as 
state and federal governments, the courts, and the US system of capitalism. CRT originated in 
the works of black female abolitionists during the anti-slavery movement (Johnson 2015). These 
women influenced W.E.B. Du Bois who would later be credited as the father of CRT (Johnson 
2015). Critical race theorists argue that racism is created by society, functions to allocate 
privilege and status to some of society, and is rooted in historical contexts (Delgado and 
Stefancic 2001). It serves as a critique of color-blindness and the neutrality of the law, by 
arguing that since racism comprises the foundation of American society, it is impossible for the 
law to be blind to race; the legal scholars and theories that created the laws were racist and so are 
the laws (Delgado and Stefancic 2001). In other words, according to CRT race and racism are 
integral parts of the way society was built and thus the way individuals interact with society at 
large. This is necessary in my discussion of abortion access because it prioritizes the role of race 
and racism in discussions of US history and US institutions. If one accepts the premise that 
racism is part of the fabric of the US it becomes clear that racism could influence how 
governments and the courts legislate abortion access, and how the reproductive rights of minority 
women can be manipulated to serve individuals with more power in society. CRT is central to 
the theory in this thesis however CRT only covers one social identity – race.  
 Intersectionality is critical to my argument as it explains how social identities interact to 
form overlapping forms of social inequality and privilege for individuals existing within multiple 
disadvantaged social identities such as low-income, minority women. Stemming in part from 
CRT and theories on privilege, feminists of color such as bell hooks, Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw, and Patricia Hill Collins apply intersectionality to explain how the experiences of 
black women are unique from white women, with whom these women share a gendered identity, 
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and black men, with whom these women share a racial identity. Put simply, intersectionality is 
the idea that individuals reside in multiple identities and that these identities interact in unique 
ways to create an experience of the world that is wholly distinctive to the individual (Crenshaw 
1989). Three points highlight the importance of intersectionality to my theory: the specificity of 
oppression, the interaction between privilege and oppression, and marginality as strength. 
First, intersectionality provides the foundation for my argument that oppression can 
disproportionately impact disadvantaged subgroups in society. Reducing access to abortion is a 
specific type of oppression that affects primarily women of color and low-income women - this 
oppresses these women while simultaneously contributing to the maintenance of privilege for 
other groups. Crenshaw (1989) explains that “the intersectional experience is greater than the 
sum of racism and sexism” (p.140). In other words, black women, for example, don’t experience 
simply both racism and sexism; they experience a type of racism that is specifically sexist, or 
conversely, a type of sexism that is specifically racist. This is applicable in my theory because I 
argue that lack of access to abortion is oppressive in multiple ways, some of which will affect all 
groups and some which will affect just a few groups depending on their identities and how they 
overlap. For example, low-income white women might experience the economic effects of 
oppression more acutely, while Native American women might experience the coercion to get 
sterilized due to lack of access to abortion and other birth control methods most prominently. 
Each group of women experiences oppression that is specific to the identities they reside in. In 
this way reducing access to abortion is a specific type of oppression that primarily affects a 
group of people who are at the intersection of multiple systems of oppression, while upholding 
privilege for others.  
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Second, intersectionality highlights the importance of social identities in shaping both 
oppression and privilege. I include this aspect of intersectionality to avoid the potential for 
ranking oppressions that could easily be interpreted from this thesis. I discuss the different ways 
reproductive oppression manifests for different groups of women however it is important to 
stress that one is not necessarily worse than another – all oppression is harmful. Collins (1993) 
argues that “there are few pure victims or oppressors…each one of us derives varying amounts 
of penalty and privilege from the multiple systems of oppression that frame our lives” (p.72). 
Individuals live in a complicated web of oppression, privilege, and power, so it is impossible to 
argue that one person is inherently more oppressed than another. Therefore, Collins argues we 
must reject additive analyses of oppression that rely on dichotomous thinking that ranks 
oppressions (1993 p.72-73). It is important to stress that many different groups reside within the 
broad “women of color” terminology and that each group has experienced the negative effects 
from lack of access to abortion differently because of the multiple identities they inhabit. One is 
not necessarily worse or better than another.  
 Finally, a critical component of intersectionality is putting forth “solutions” or ways of 
improving the inequality that disadvantaged groups face. This is crucial to my theory because it 
provides a potential solution to the systems of oppression I discuss in my thesis. May (2012) 
argues that intersectionality reconceptualizes marginality by focusing on the politics of location, 
placing marginalized groups as subjects with agency that have the potential to disrupt systems of 
domination via their place at the bottom of society (p. 81). Thus, women that I argue are 
oppressed by race, class, and institutional manipulation of their reproductive abilities have the 
potential to see the systems that oppress them clearly due to their place at the margins of society, 
allowing them to devise creative solutions and produce knowledge that helps them escape from 
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the systems that oppress them (hooks 1984, May 2012). In the conclusion to this thesis I offer 
some potential solutions to the systems of oppression I describe – this discourse on marginality 
and the production of knowledge will be particularly important in that discussion.  
 This thesis is theoretically grounded in intersectionality, critical race theory, and radical 
and third-wave feminist theories of oppression and privilege. Each of these theories provides a 
perspective that helps tease apart the many overlapping issues and identities that are important in 
this discussion of abortion access. I argue that anti-abortion legislation and the subsequent lack 
of access to abortion disproportionately affects women of color and low-income women, and that 
this constitutes a form of reproductive oppression. Chapter 2 establishes the first aspect of this 
thesis, arguing that anti-abortion legislation reduces access to abortion for minority women and 
is influenced by an anti-abortion movement that has ties to racist movements and encourages 
racialized fears. In other words, a racialized anti-abortion movement influences legislation that 
has disproportionate effects on women of color and low-income women.  
Chapter 3 builds on the theory presented in Chapter 2 by incorporating discussions of 
oppression. First, I argue that reproductive oppression is consistently connected to larger systems 
of oppression seen throughout history, and that reduced access to abortion is the current 
manifestation of that recurring theme. This argument build’s on CRT’s position that racism is an 
entrenched, historical fact of American society. Second, I argue that reduced access to abortion is 
connected to an ongoing project of population control by encouraging minority women, who 
have few other options for birth control, to sterilize themselves. Finally, I argue that the 
increasing financial burden placed on women attempting to access abortion and the financial 
burdens of childcare placed on women in the welfare system unable to access abortion, 
effectively keep these women in perpetual poverty and lock them in a lower-class status. I draw 
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on the feminist approaches to Marxism discussed above to support this argument. Thus, each of 
the theories discussed in this chapter are integral to my theory of reproductive oppression 
through reduced access to abortion.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Current abortion legislation is influenced by a history of conservative politics and anti-
abortion activism. The moral panics and rise in conservative sexual politics that characterized the 
late 20th century influenced political attitudes and legislation in the US including most major 
federal decisions surrounding abortion (di Mauro & Joffe 2007). This led to a decline in abortion 
access and the current state of harsh restrictions surrounding abortion we see today. This chapter 
begins with a brief discussion of the anti-abortion movement to clarify the context of subsequent 
anti-abortion legislation. I argue that racism characterizes the anti-abortion movement, and thus 
influences much of the anti-abortion legislation in place today. I support this claim by examining 
major pieces of anti-abortion legislation and case law and highlight the disproportionate and 
negative effect on women of color and low-income women. In short, this chapter argues that 
reduced access to abortion disproportionately affects women of color and low-income women.  
 
 
The Anti-Abortion Movement 
 
Extreme individual level activism in the anti-abortion movement has historically had 
close ties with white supremacist groups like the KKK and neo-Nazis (Ross 1994). As Ross 
(1994) explains “[r]eligious zealotry, nostalgia for a more culturally ‘pure’ America, and a 
frightening rhetoric that encourages violence in the name of deeply held ideals fuels white 
supremacists and many anti-abortionists alike”. The sharing of ideals between the two 
movements extends to the sharing of individual members.  
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Relatedly, it is important to note that important leaders of anti-abortion organizations in 
the 1980s and 90s held close ties with white supremacist groups (Hughes 2006, Ross 1994). Two 
figures stand out as prominent connections between white supremacist groups and the anti-
abortion movement: Randall Terry, leader of the influential anti-abortion activist group 
Operation Rescue, and John Burt, former regional director of pro-life group Rescue America. 
Burt was a former Klansman and, in a nod to practices originated by the Klan, Terry and other 
leaders of Operation Rescue would issue Wanted posters against doctors who performed 
abortions (Ross 1994). In other words, leaders of some of the most important anti-abortion 
movements in the late 20th century held close ties with and were influenced by the KKK.  
 At the institutional level, there is a history of politicians using anti-abortion rhetoric to 
support their broader agendas, for example, hiding the War on Drugs and supporting anti-
immigration sentiment. For example, Ronald Reagan published a book entitled Abortion and the 
Conscience of the Nation in 1984 that linked the sanctity of the life of slaves with the sanctity of 
fetal life to gain support among anti-abortion activists (Hughes 2006 p.10). The book’s message 
caught on with anti-abortion organizations and comparisons were made between Reagan and 
Abraham Lincoln who were both, according to anti-abortion rhetoric, emancipators of oppressed 
peoples (Hughes 2006 p.10-11).  
The rhetorical success of Reagan’s book in making him appear emancipatory hid his 
broader political agenda. Ironically, at the same time as Reagan was hailing the emancipation of 
slaves and being compared to Lincoln, he was increasing funding to federal law enforcement 
agencies’ antidrug departments in the first steps of his War on Drugs (Alexander 2012). This 
“war” would eventually lead to the mass incarceration of millions of black and Latino men and 
women and the creation of a racial underclass (Alexander 2012). Reagan was skilled at using 
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language that hid his true intentions; he was never openly racist and “[t]he absence of explicitly 
racist rhetoric afforded the racial nature of his coded appeals a certain plausible deniability” 
(Alexander 2012 p.48). Thus, appropriating abolitionist era rhetoric in his arguments against 
abortion made his anti-abortion message seem more appealing while simultaneously clouding the 
fact that overall his policies were explicitly racist in nature. In this way, the anti-abortion 
movement and its rhetoric is tied to a larger movement against people of color.  
 Anti-abortion activists have also tied their rhetoric to anti-immigration sentiment. Dubow 
(2011) notes that “[i]n November 2006, the Missouri House of Representatives issued a report 
concluding that abortion was a factor in the rise of illegal immigration because it created a 
shortage of American-born workers” (p.156). Others have drawn on post-9/11 fears to argue that 
since “Muslim countries” don’t allow abortion they have higher birthrates than “Aryan” 
countries that do allow abortion, and are immigrating to the latter so that eventually they will 
overtake white people as the majority population (Dubow 2011 p.156). These explicitly racist 
arguments against abortion for white women prey on the fears of some Americans regarding 
their job security and the potential threat of terrorism. When encouraged in this way, these fears 
often lead to anti-Latino and Islamophobic sentiments. This is critical to my argument because it 
suggests that politicians use anti-abortion legislation and rhetoric as tools to accomplish 
racialized political agendas.  
These racialized political arguments draw on the fear that the white race will go extinct, 
the assumption that abortion is the reason for lower birthrates among white women, and the 
assumption that banning abortion will automatically lead to higher birthrates among white 
women, despite evidence to the contrary for all of these fears. In doing so, these political 
arguments against abortion place the supposed problem in the reproductive systems of women of 
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color and the supposed solution in the reproductive systems of white women. I continue by 
arguing that this rhetoric and accompanying negative public opinion towards women of color has 
led to legislation that reduces access to abortion with an underlying aim of making upper- and 
middle-class white women reproduce more. To deal with the anticipated increase in babies of 
color that would accompany this, I argue that anti-abortion legislation works in tandem with 
other policies that encourage women of color to seek other forms of birth control such as 
sterilization, and policies that trap low-income mothers of color in poverty to exploit their labor.  
 
 
Legislation 
 
The United States government and various state governments have been relatively hostile 
towards abortion in the 46 years since Roe v. Wade. I start with an explanation of the precedent 
Roe v. Wade (1973) (Roe) establishes. Roe challenged the Texas criminal abortion law that 
outlawed all abortions except to save the life of the mother. The State made two major arguments 
against abortion, however only one argument is important enough to mention here, namely, the 
State’s argument that it had an interest in protecting pre-natal life (Roe v. Wade p. 150). The 
Court agreed with the State, however they noted that many of the state laws criminalizing 
abortion protected the life of the mother rather than the unborn fetus and were therefore not 
applicable under that reason for abortion restriction (p. 151). Additionally, they qualified that this 
interest only becomes “compelling” after the first trimester (p. 163). This State interest in pre-
natal life would be a key aspect in subsequent Court decisions that would eventually erode 
abortion access. 
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The Court ruled in favor of Roe, citing the right to privacy1 despite this initial 
prioritization of state’s rights (p. 125). Significantly, the Court ruled that regulation of abortion 
in the first trimester was illegal, but that the state could regulate abortion in the second trimester 
for the purpose of maternal health, and that states could ban abortion after viability if they chose 
to do so (p. 163). Importantly, restrictions to abortion access would have to pass the “strict 
scrutiny” test before legalization (p. 170). Subsequent court decisions weakened Roe, however 
the basic right to privacy still applies to abortion.   
 The Hyde Amendment is the first major piece of legislation to reduce access to abortion 
after Roe. Initially passed in 1976, it removes federal funding for abortions under Medicaid 
except in cases where the life of the mother is endangered, or in cases of rape or incest 
(Engstrom 2016 p. 452). Ensuing renewals extended the amendment to cover federal funds 
directed towards Native Americans, federal employees, people with disabilities, veterans, prison 
inmates, children funded under the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and insurance plans 
that are federally subsidized under the Affordable Care Act (Adashi and Occhiogrosso 2017 p. 
1523). In other words, it essentially eliminates all federal funding for abortions. To put this in 
perspective, should the Hyde Amendment be repealed more than 14.5 million women of 
reproductive age would be eligible for federal assistance for their abortion procedures 
(Salganicoff, Sobel & Ramaswamy 2019).  
 This reduction disproportionately limits abortions for Native American women by 
defunding abortions provided through The Indian Health Service (IHS). The IHS is a federally 
funded program that provides healthcare to Native Americans living on reservations (Lawrence 
 
1 While there is no explicit right to privacy written into the Constitution it is generally interpreted from the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 
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2000) and is the primary provider of reproductive health care for many Native American women 
(Arnold 2014). The IHS currently serves roughly a third of the Native American/Alaska Native 
population (Donovan 2017). Medicaid insures many Native American women who are not 
insured by the IHS because of high rates of poverty among Indigenous populations, thus 
restricting abortion access for many Native women not living on reservations (Donovan 2017). 
Additionally, IHS facilities are often the only easily accessible local healthcare provider for 
many Native Americans meaning that even if an Indigenous woman is not federally insured, she 
may not have access to a non-federally funded healthcare provider, and thus has limited access to 
abortion services (Donovan 2017).  
Since Native American women face a disproportionately high risk of sexual assault and 
teen pregnancy, they have a higher demand for abortion (Arnold 2014 p. 1892). Indigenous 
women are 2.2 times more likely than white women to have experienced forced penetration 
(Rosay 2010) and Native American teens have the third highest teen pregnancy rate behind black 
and Latina teens (Wiltz 2015). Despite this higher demand, the IHS performed only 25 abortions 
from 1981-2001 and many IHS facilities lack basic abortion services such as Mifeprex2 (Arnold 
2014 p. 1892). Although the Hyde Amendment allows federal funding for abortion in cases of 
rape, the extremely low number of IHS abortions performed suggests that the IHS is potentially 
unable to comply with this stipulation. In other words, Native American/Alaska Native women 
frequently lack insurance coverage for and easy physical access to abortion services. This 
suggests that the Hyde Amendment’s restrictions on federal funding for abortions provided 
through the IHS results in reduced access to abortion services for Native American women.  
 
2 Mifeprex (mifepristone) is a pill that blocks the hormone progesterone that is needed to continue pregnancy and, 
when taken with another pill (misoprostol), aborts an early pregnancy (USFDA 2019). 
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 The Hyde Amendment also directly affects low-income women by denying abortion 
funding for people insured through Medicaid. A first trimester abortion can cost an average of 
$470 while a second trimester abortion can cost an average of $1,500, depending on the type of 
abortion and the abortion provider (Engstrom 2016). Thirty-four states and the District of 
Columbia currently comply with the Hyde Amendment’s specifications, restricting funding for 
abortion through Medicaid except in cases of rape or incest, or life endangerment (Salganicoff et 
al 2019). South Dakota restricts access further by only paying for abortions in cases of life 
endangerment (Salganicoff et al 2019). The Guttmacher Institute considers most of these states 
hostile to abortion (State Abortion Policy Landscape 2019). According to the US Department of 
Labor the average minimum wage is roughly $8.93 per hour, or about $1,547 per month. 
Therefore, a second trimester abortion for a single income family living on the average minimum 
wage may cost a few dollars less than a month’s wages. The impact of this expense is clearly 
visible in one study which reported that many women needed to divert money from living 
expenses such as rent (14%), food (16%), or bills (30%) to pay for their abortions (Boonstra 
2013 p. 6). Coupling this with the fact that low-income women have higher rates of unintended 
pregnancy than upper- and middle-class women (Engstrom 2016 p. 455) provides the foundation 
for my argument that the Hyde Amendment disproportionately and negatively impacts low-
income women.  
 Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Casey) is another major step towards erosion of abortion 
access. In the 1992 decision the Supreme Court upheld the right to abortion granted in Roe while 
simultaneously undermining some of the most important aspects of that case. First, it removed 
the “strict scrutiny” standard that had previously applied to laws meant to restrict abortion access 
and replaced it with an “undue burden” standard (Planned Parenthood v. Casey p. 837). Casey 
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defined a law as unduly burdensome if “its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in 
the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability” (p. 837). This 
contrasts with the “strict scrutiny” standard which only allows a potentially restrictive law to 
pass if the law furthers a “compelling government interest” (LII 2019) and means that the burden 
of proof shifts from the government to the citizen. This also means that the bar was lowered for 
restrictive legislation, allowing states to pass more restrictive legislation (discussed below). 
Second, the Court rejected the trimester framework established in Roe, arguing instead that the 
state has an interest in potential life throughout pregnancy (Planned Parenthood v. Casey p. 
837). This differs radically from Roe’s stipulation that the first trimester be free from restrictions. 
Finally, the Casey decision abandoned the principle of government neutrality regarding abortion. 
This allows states to incentivize childbirth over abortion on the grounds that it does not 
technically restrict a woman’s access to abortion (Benshoof 1993b p. 2253). However, Benshoof 
(1993a) argues that this stipulation effectively allows states to discourage women from choosing 
abortion (p.163).  
Together, these stipulations made it much easier for states to pass legislation that reduced 
access to abortion. For example, when a court is analyzing a potentially restrictive law it often 
looks at the law in isolation. The problem with this is that while a law may not be unduly 
burdensome by itself, it may be extremely burdensome in combination with the various other 
state laws it interacts with (Young 2014). Additionally, a law may not restrict access to abortion 
for a pregnant woman at its face, but it could regulate abortion clinics so much so as to 
effectively remove any easy options for abortion for women (Young 2014). This loophole has 
led to a slew of state laws restricting abortion access called “Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers” or “TRAP” laws (Young 2014).   
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 TRAP laws work to close abortion clinics by placing extraneous and unnecessary 
requirements on abortion providers. These requirements include mandating that clinics meet 
personnel and facility guidelines usually reserved for ambulatory surgical centers, forcing 
abortion providers to have admitting privileges in a nearby hospital, and demanding abortion 
facilities to have transfer agreements with a nearby hospital (Austin & Harper 2019). All of these 
have been shown to be unnecessary – abortion is an extremely safe procedure and does not 
require surgery standard facilities or personnel (Austin & Harper 2019). This suggests that the 
real purpose of these requirements is reducing abortion access. 
Indeed, legislatures write the laws under the guise of protecting maternal health but often 
explicitly intend to reduce abortion access (Greasley 2017). For example, one Texas bill (HB2) 
intended to impose admitting privileges and surgical center requirements on Texas abortion 
clinics, supposedly to protect women’s health (Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt p. 1). After 
the Texas Senate passed HB2, the Republican Lieutenant Governor “tweeted a photo of a map 
that showed all of the abortion clinics that would close as a result of the bill, accompanied by the 
caption: ‘We fought to pass [HB2] thru the Senate last night, & this is why!’” (Greasley 2017 p. 
327). This suggests that HB2’s real goal was closing abortion clinics, not protecting women’s 
health. Fortunately, the Supreme Court struck down HB2 as unconstitutional under Casey in 
Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt. Pro-choice activists generally viewed the decision as a 
success because the Court took a broader, more holistic approach to examining the effect of the 
law, rather than simply examining the individual effect it would have (Greasley 2017). However, 
some argue that the decision acts to further perpetuate the idea validated in Casey that abortion is 
dangerous to women’s physical and mental health (Goodwin 2017, Greasley 2017). The Whole 
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Woman’s Health decision kept with Casey’s stipulations for finding undue burden (Greasley 
2017) and rooted the flawed undue burden framework deeper into precedent (Goodwin 2017).  
Indeed, the broader effect of Whole Woman’s Health is still uncertain. As of mid-2017, 
25 states have enacted TRAP laws while 21 states have enacted and enforced those laws (Austin 
and Harper 2019). In June 2019 CNN reported that six states – Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia – have only one abortion clinic (Yan 2019). And 
the ACLU notes that “judges on lower courts who disagree with Roe v. Wade, are already 
starting to ignore the Whole Woman’s Health ruling” (Arons n.d.). Thus, there are still a 
multitude of legislative barriers to abortion access despite the Whole Woman’s Health ruling.  
 
 
Effect of Legislation 
 
 Most US states are hostile to abortion. The Guttmacher Institute classifies a state as 
hostile based on six limitations on abortion3 including an abortion ban that violates constitutional 
protections, restriction of Medicaid coverage, and any unnecessary abortion clinic requirements 
(State Abortion Policy Landscape 2019). Twenty-nine states meet the Guttmacher Institute’s 
definition of hostile4. This means that 58% of women of reproductive age live in states that are 
 
3 Each limitation garners a score of -1. There are also six protective policies that hold a score of 1. A state’s score is 
found by adding or subtracting depending on how many hostile or protective policies a state has. Thus, a state must 
have at least a score of -2 to be defined as hostile to abortion (State Abortion Policy Landscape 2019).  
4 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (State Abortion Policy 
Landscape 2019). 
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hostile towards abortion and therefore have limited access to abortion (State Abortion Policy 
Landscape 2019). 
 There are several reasons I expect hostile abortion policies to have a greater effect on 
women of color and low-income women. First, anti-abortion policies have a greater effect on 
women of color simply because the states where they are active house more women of color, 
particularly black and Indigenous women. Abortion hostile states hold 52% of the women of 
color5 in the US (US Census Bureau 2017). Specifically, 61% of Native American women and 
69% of black women live in abortion hostile states, however 53% of Hispanic/Latina women and 
69% of Asian American/Pacific Islander women live in states that are protective of abortion (US 
Census Bureau 2017). This suggests that black women and Native American women feel the 
effects of anti-abortion legislation more harshly simply because of where most of them live6. 
Thus, the demographics of abortion hostile states, which provide a partial picture of who is 
affected by anti-abortion legislation, suggest that black and Native American women potentially 
feel the effects of that legislation more than other groups because of their location in the US.  
Second, women of color and low-income women have higher rates of abortion than do 
white women and higher income women. In 2008, white women had a rate of 12 abortions per 
1000 reproductive age women, Hispanic women had a rate of 29 per 1000, and black women had 
a rate of 40 per 1000 (Dehlendorf et al 2013). Native American women get abortions at twice the 
rate of white women (Urban Indian Health Institute 2010). Women with incomes less than 100% 
 
5 Women of color being defined here as women who identify on the Census as African American, American 
Indian/Alaska Native, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latina, or two or more races.  
6 This is not to say that Hispanic/Latina and Asian American/Pacific Islander women are not disproportionately 
affected by anti-abortion legislation. State demographics are just one measure of who is affected by legislation, and 
other ways will be discussed below. However, the fact that most black and Native American women live in abortion 
hostile states is significant and therefore worth mentioning. 
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of the federal poverty level (FPL) have an abortion rate of 52 per 1000, compared with 9 per 
1000 among women with incomes greater than 200% of the FPL (Dehlendorf et al 2013 p. 
1772). In general, Asian women (11 per 1000) have lower rates of abortion than white women, 
however Indian (26.5 per 1000) and Japanese (14.7 per 1000) women experience higher rates of 
abortion (Population Association 2016). In other words, women of color and low-income women 
in general have a greater demand for abortion than white women and higher-income women. I 
argue, therefore, that restricting access to abortion has a greater impact on minority women 
because they are the primary users of abortion services.  
 Finally, limited access to abortion disproportionately affects low-income women because 
they have fewer financial resources to pay for the procedure. Numerous studies show that the 
cost of getting an abortion is a major hurdle for many women. For example, Margo et al (2016) 
found that many women frequently cited paying for their abortions as a major challenge because 
insurance did not cover any of the procedures. Many of the women resorted to borrowing funds 
from family and friends and utilized clinic discounts whenever possible (Margo et al 2016 p. 
205). Quantitative data concurs, finding that a majority of participants not using health insurance 
to pay for their abortions found it somewhat or very difficult to pay for their procedures, which 
ranged in price from $485-$3,500 (Jones, Upadhyay & Weitz 2013 p. 175).  
Anti-abortion measures also affect women of color more harshly. For example, the 
participants in Jones et al’s (2013) study were mostly women of color, with 73% of the study 
participants identifying as black, Hispanic, or “other” (p. 176). Additionally, women who are 
seeking abortion but are nearing or past the gestational age limits for abortion in their state are 
more likely to be multiracial or some race other than white (Upadhyay, Weitz, Jones, Barar, & 
Foster 2014 p. 1689). This was generally due to broader systemic issues associated with 
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institutional racism such as poor sex education and ineffective governmental support systems for 
childcare (Upadhyay et al 2014 p. 1689). Altogether, this evidence indicates that legislation that 
restricts access to abortion disproportionately affects women of color and low-income women. 
 This chapter argues that anti-abortion legislation disproportionately effects women of 
color and low-income women. An examination of major anti-abortion court decisions and federal 
regulations reveals that reduced access to abortion disproportionately effects women of color and 
low-income women. I contextualize this phenomenon within the anti-abortion movement, 
arguing that this movement is both influential in US politics and connected to racist movements 
and political ideologies. Chapter 3 expands on this discussion and argues that such a 
disproportionate effect on women of color and low-income women functions as reproductive 
oppression. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
In this chapter I make three major claims. First, anti-abortion legislation is connected to 
larger systems of oppression such as the war on drugs and militaristic immigration enforcement. 
Systems of reproductive oppression have historically been tied to broader systems of oppression. 
Reproductive oppression describes the idea that anyone, but specifically women and girls, are 
oppressed when their bodies, sexuality, labor, and reproduction are controlled, exploited, or 
suppressed for others’ gain (Manes 2017). For example, the common practice of raping women 
enslaved on Southern plantations and then selling the resultant child into slavery was 
reproductively oppressive because, among other reasons, it violated the enslaved woman’s 
autonomy and used her reproductive capacities for the plantation owner’s gain (Ross 1998). 
Thus, the connection between anti-abortion legislation and broader systems of oppression 
suggest that anti-abortion legislation is oppressive. Second, I argue that reduced access to 
abortion, in combination with reduced access to other forms of birth control, contributes to 
higher rates of sterilization and sterilization regret in minority groups. Finally, I argue that pro-
life states encourage childbirth for welfare recipients thus funneling them into a family welfare 
program that is exploitative and oppressive. These three claims support my broader argument, 
suggesting that the disproportionate effect reduced access to abortion has on low-income women 
and women of color is a form of reproductive oppression. 
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Historical Context 
 
 Reproductive oppression has historically been connected to broader systems of 
oppression such as colonization and slavery. For example, European colonizers manipulated and 
suppressed the reproduction and cultural reproductive systems of Native American women as 
part of their larger project of settler colonialism (Smith 2005). Prior to colonization, Native 
American women were considered autonomous persons, held positions of power and esteem, and 
were often leaders in matriarchal societies (Ralstin-Lewis 2005). Christian colonization disrupted 
much of the gender equality in Native communities by introducing patriarchy and attempting to 
force Native family structures to conform to Western structures that emphasized male-
domination (Ralstin-Lewis 2005). As the project of settling the American West became an 
important political goal in the nineteenth century, reproduction among white settlers was 
encouraged, while Indigenous reproduction was actively discouraged (Jacobs 2017). For 
example, the 1850 Oregon Donation Land Act allowed white married couples to claim twice as 
much land as a single white male settler, thus encouraging marriage and inevitably reproduction 
among white settlers. Conversely, the 1887 Dawes Act severely decreased the amount of land 
available to Native peoples. This, combined with unreliable government support for Native 
Americans on reservations, led to rampant malnutrition and disease leading to a steep decline in 
the Indigenous population (Jacobs 2017). The manipulation of Indigenous reproductive systems 
served a larger purpose – by controlling and manipulating Native bodies and gender 
constructions European settler colonizers were able to justify and achieve colonial domination of 
the Americas (Cremer 2008).  
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 Institutionalized slavery in America was also characterized by rampant reproductive 
oppression. The American slave trade stripped African mothers of their role as mother, destroyed 
African family structures, and reduced African women to laborers and reproductive machines. In 
many places in Africa, mothers were important members of their communities, transmitting 
knowledge, culture, and values to their children (Bush 2010 p. 69). The slave trade reduced and 
commodified this role. For example, African mothers were usually stripped of their important 
religious belongings before being transported across the ocean and were therefore unable to 
perform many of the rituals associated with childbirth (Bush 2010 p. 79). Thus, the slave trade 
reduced African women’s abilities to fully connect with the role of mother by alienating them 
from their communities and limiting their ability to participate in their traditions of motherhood.  
Slave traders were simultaneously commodifying the reproductive capacities of African 
women. Women often comprised a majority of the slave population due to their ability to bear 
children (Soomer 2000). They were dehumanized as breeders and whores to justify the rampant 
practice of rape, and the children of those unions were frequently sold into slavery (Soomer 
2000). Enslaved women would sometimes abort their offspring in a simultaneous act of mercy 
for their unborn child and rebellion against their designated role as breeder (Schiebinger 2005 p. 
318). Thus, plantation owners sought to restrict enslaved women’s knowledge about birth control 
and abortion in order to avoid this rebellion and maximize their profits (Ross 1998). These are 
just a few examples of the ways in which enslaved women’s reproductive capacities were 
manipulated and commodified for other’s gain, but they demonstrate the important role of 
reproductive oppression in the broader system of slavery. 
 These historical connections between reproductive oppression and more general 
oppression unveil a pattern on which my argument centers: systems of domination manipulate 
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women’s reproduction to maintain control over the dominated peoples at large. The following 
two examples of anti-abortion legislation connected to current examples of oppression suggest 
that modern forms of domination are using reduced access to abortion to maintain control. I 
argue that this suggests that reduced access to abortion is a form of reproductive oppression 
because it aligns with the historical pattern identified above.  
First, some scholars link the war on drugs with the anti-abortion movement and anti-
abortion legislation. At a superficial level, there are many similarities between the anti-abortion 
movement and the War on Drugs. For example, Ferraiolo (2014) argues that marijuana usage and 
abortion are both “morality policy” issues used to garner support for one political party or 
alternatively to malign the other political party. Paltrow (2001) finds eight distinctive similarities 
between the War on Drugs and what she calls the “war on abortion”: control and punishment 
justified by illegality, restrictions on speech, limited access, the language of “epidemics”, lack of 
education surrounding both sex and drugs, choice rhetoric, child protection as justification for 
illegality, and disproportionate harm for African American women (Paltrow 2001). These 
similarities indicate a broader political agenda that acts to reduce civil liberties and social 
mobility for women and people of color. They also suggest that the anti-abortion movement may 
overlap with the War on Drugs. 
 Beyond these similarities however, the political agendas of both movements actively 
reinforce one another. For example, the anti-abortion argument in support of giving fetuses rights 
actively supported, and was supported by, efforts to imprison black women. Dubow (2011) 
describes how the “crack baby epidemic” in the late 1980s and early 1990s helped to support the 
anti-abortion argument for fetal rights while simultaneously supporting racist stereotypes about 
black mothers as drug addicts lacking maternal instincts (p.141-142). In other words, the rhetoric 
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that pregnant black women were dosing their unborn children with cocaine symbolically 
supported both the anti-abortion movement’s push to define viable fetuses as humans with rights, 
and the War on Drugs’ argument that black women were all drug addicts without maternal 
instincts. However, the interaction between the two movements was more than just symbolic and 
extended to physically imprisoning mothers who used crack cocaine during their pregnancy 
(Dubow 2011). For example, many South Carolina hospitals would test babies and pregnant 
women for cocaine when they entered the hospital and report any positive findings to law 
enforcement (Dubow 2011 p. 145-146). The charges varied depending on the specific 
circumstances from drug possession, delivering drugs to a minor, child neglect, and, in an 
extreme case, homicide, but often ended in incarceration for the mother, who was usually black 
(Dubow 2011 p. 145, 151). This is despite evidence that suggests that cocaine has few adverse 
health effects on children exposed in the womb via their mother, especially when compared to 
the effects of substances that are used far more commonly such as tobacco and alcohol (Chavkin 
2001). While many of the cases prosecuting these women have fortunately been overturned in 
higher courts, South Carolina still defines a viable fetus as a person and has recently introduced a 
bill to ban abortion when a fetal heartbeat is detected (SC Fetal Heartbeat Protection from 
Abortion Act 2019). Thus, the anti-abortion movement contributed to the oppression of women 
of color within the War on Drugs.  
 Finally, reduced access to abortion has recently been used to police immigrant women 
and Latinas who live near the US border with Mexico. Gomez (2015) describes how reduced 
access to abortion in Texas makes immigrant and US born Latina women in the Rio Grande 
Valley at risk of being detained and potentially deported as illegal immigrants. The Rio Grande 
Valley is home to numerous checkpoints along major highways that work to find potentially 
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illegal immigrants (Gomez 2015 p. 94). The Valley has extremely limited access to abortion – it 
has been classified as a “medically underserved area” and is lacking in options for primary 
healthcare (Gomez 2015 p. 98). Thus, Latina immigrant women must either travel to the nearest 
US abortion clinic on highways riddled with immigration enforcement checkpoints, or risk going 
to Mexico for their abortion and being denied access back into the US (Gomez 2015). This 
restricts their physical movement, literally confining them to a small area of Texas that is lacking 
in necessary healthcare services. More recently, The Washington Post reported in June 2019 that 
the Trump administration had instituted a ban on abortion for minors detained in immigration 
custody. Fortunately, an injunction on the policy has allowed all women affected to proceed with 
their abortions, but the effort highlights the continuing struggle that pregnant immigrant women 
must face (Marimow 2019).  
 These examples of the connection between the anti-abortion movement, anti-abortion 
legislation, and larger systems of racial oppression suggest that current systems of domination 
are using reduced access to abortion as a method of control. Historically, scholars classify 
manipulation of women’s reproduction within larger systems of oppression such as colonization 
and slavery as reproductive oppression. Thus, I suggest that reduced access to abortion functions 
as a form of reproductive oppression because of its connection with larger systems of oppression 
such as the war on drugs and anti-immigration policy enforcement.  
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Sterilization 
 
 Minority communities have historically experienced sterilization abuse. While blatant 
sterilization abuse is uncommon today, I argue that reduced access to abortion and other forms of 
birth control contribute to higher rates of sterilization and sterilization regret in minority 
communities. This would qualify reduced access to abortion and birth control as a form of subtle 
coercion (Clarke 1994, discussed below) which I argue is oppressive because it restricts 
women’s ability to make autonomous decisions regarding reproduction.  
Eugenic sterilization programs in the mid-20th century led to thousands of sterilizations of 
Black and Native American women, and Latinas, and that trend has continued through to today. 
Estimates indicate that up to 70,000 Native American women (out of 100,000-150,000 women of 
childbearing age) underwent coerced sterilization from the early to mid-1960s to 1976 (Ralstin-
Lewis 2005 p. 71-72). Puerto Rico’s aggressive population control policies resulted in the 
sterilization of roughly one third of women of child-bearing age by 1965 (Mass 1977). Social 
Darwinism and eugenics politics heavily influenced these high rates of coerced sterilization 
among women of color (Mass 1977, Ralstin-Lewis 2005, Shreffler, McQuillan, Greil & Johnson 
2015). This historical trend has had impacts on current sterilization trends. 
Today, women are less likely to experience coercion when getting sterilized, but women 
of color and low-income women still have the highest rates of sterilization and importantly 
sterilization regret (Shreffler et al 2015). Black and Native American women are more likely to 
have undergone sterilization than non-Hispanic white women (Volscho 2010). This remains true 
for black women even when controlling for partner vasectomy status (Borrero et al 2009). 
Shreffler et al (2015) found that Hispanic women were less likely to undergo surgical 
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sterilization when controlling for socioeconomic status (p. 14). However, they, along with Native 
American women, were more likely to see their sterilization as preventing them from having 
desired children (Shreffler et al 2015 p. 15). Shreffler et al (2015) found that black women were 
not likely to regret their procedure, however Eeckhaut et al (2018) found that black women were 
likely to regret their sterilization. Asian women were not more likely than white women to have 
undergone sterilization (Shreffler et al 2015 p. 14). Ultimately, this suggests that the historically 
high rates of sterilization for black, Hispanic, and Native American women has continued to 
today, and that many women eventually regret their procedure. 
 Women of color’s higher rates of sterilization can be partly explained by reduced access 
to impermanent birth control methods, such as abortion. This functions through a process which 
Clarke (1994) calls ‘subtle coercion’, defined in relation to sterilization as “situations in which a 
woman or man legally consents to sterilization, but the social conditions in which they do so are 
abusive – the conditions of their lives constrain their capacity to exercise genuine reproductive 
choice and autonomy” (p. 341, emphasis in original). For example, Gurr (2011) argues that the 
high rates of sterilization on Native American reservations can be traced back to limited birth 
control options, including abortion. Birth control pills are dispensed to Native American women 
living on reservations only once a month, frequently from IHS facilities that are difficult to 
reach, access to emergency contraception is patchy, and abortion access is limited due to the 
Hyde Amendment (Gurr 2011 p. 72-80). Conversely, less effective birth control options such as 
condoms, and long-term birth control options such as Depo-Provera, Norplant, and sterilization 
are more easily available and more widely promoted (Gurr 2011 p. 74-77).  
Reduced access to impermanent birth control and abortion is also common among other 
racial minorities. Despite an overall increase in the number of young women using sexual and 
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reproductive health (SRH) services, black and Hispanic women are still less likely to effectively 
use contraception (Murray Horwitz et al 2018). However, they are just as likely as white women 
to use long-acting reversable contraceptives (LARC) and condoms, in similar fashion to the 
Native American women discussed above (Murray Horwitz et al 2018). These low rates of 
contraception use, combined with women of color’s higher rates of sterilization, suggest that 
social conditions wherein birth control and abortion are difficult to access contribute to increased 
usage of permanent birth control methods.  
This becomes problematic when women begin to regret their sterilizations. As discussed 
above, women of color are more likely to regret their sterilizations and see them as preventing 
them from having desired children (Eeckhaut et al 2018, Shreffler et al 2015). Additionally, there 
has been a 41% increase in sterilization regret, from 18% in 1995 to 25% in 2006-2010 
(Eeckhaut et al 2018). This suggests that had these women had better access to impermanent 
birth control options, such as abortion, prior to sterilization they might have been able to delay or 
avoid the procedure which they now regret. Women who have more options for birth control 
have more nuanced control over their reproductive capacities and are therefore not as easily 
subject to subtle coercion. More options for birth control, such as abortion, could prevent women 
from getting sterilizations which they later regret. Since women of color have higher rates of 
sterilization regret and have less access to abortion (due to reasons discussed throughout this 
thesis such as restrictive federal funding and limited physical access), I suggest that reduced 
access to abortion is oppressive to these women – it limits their reproductive options, subtly 
coerces them into getting sterilized, and prevents them from having children that they want. 
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Poverty 
 
 Poverty is feminized and racialized (Elmelech & Lu 2004) and while the reasons for this 
are nuanced and historically situated, I posit that reduced access to abortion is one factor that 
supports the feminization of poverty. The feminization of poverty thesis argues that women and 
their children are disproportionately represented in the population of individuals in poverty 
(Elmelech & Lu 2004). In the 1980s, scholars revised the feminization of poverty thesis to more 
accurately reflect the racialized nature of the problem, renaming it the racial feminization of 
poverty (Elmelech & Lu 2004). The issue continues today – women were 38% more likely than 
men to live in poverty in 2016 (Patrick 2017). However, women of color and women with 
disabilities are more likely than white women to be in poverty: in 2016, 9.7% of white, non-
Hispanic women were in poverty while 10.7%, 18.7%, 21.4%, and 22.8% of Asian, Latinx, 
black, and Native American women were in poverty, respectively (Patrick 2017). Thirty-one 
percent of women with disabilities were in poverty in 2016 (Patrick 2017). This trend persists 
despite “comparable human capital and positive work ethic attributes and characteristics” at least 
among black women (Ezeala-Harrison 2010 p. 149), but potentially among other groups of 
women as well. This suggests that high rates of poverty are unrelated to labor market reasons and 
have more to do with institutional sources of inequality (Ezeala-Harrison 2010). I argue that 
reduced access to abortion is one of those institutional sources.  
Abortion is expensive, especially for women in poverty who are disproportionately 
women of color. As discussed in previous sections, women frequently cite cost as one of the 
most difficult aspects of obtaining an abortion (Margo et al 2016). A single mother working for 
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minimum wage could potentially have to spend a month’s wages or divert money from rent, 
food, or bills to pay for her abortion (Boonstra 2013). While clinics frequently offer financial 
support to women, they often have limited resources and thus cannot completely remove the 
financial burden of abortion. The high cost of abortion places women in poverty in a double-bind 
situation where they are forced to choose between an expensive abortion that could potentially 
remove their access to food, basic utilities such as water, or housing, or have children and qualify 
for family welfare, usually Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, that is oppressive and 
exploitative.  
 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) provides time-limited financial 
assistance to low-income families and is the primary financial welfare system covering women 
in poverty with children. TANF proclaims that it works “to prevent and reduce the incidence of 
out-of-wedlock marriages” and encourage two-parent homes (HHS.gov 2012), suggesting that it 
is hostile towards single mothers. A work first ideology characterizes TANF, and penalties, 
financial sanctions, and restrictive eligibility enforce this ideology (Bowie and Dopwell 2013 p. 
178). TANF also enforces a five-year lifetime maximum limit for financial assistance, with 
several states stiffening limits to four, three, or two-year maximums (Bowie and Dopwell 2013 
p. 178). It is within this context that low-income women and especially low-income women of 
color face a multitude of barriers to upward mobility.  
Welfare, especially welfare in pro-life states, is oppressive because it encourages mothers 
of color into low-wage reproductive labor that has few prospects for advancement, effectively 
trapping minority mothers in poverty. Glenn (1992) and Duffy (2007) argue that reproductive 
labor, defined as work that is needed to sustain everyday life such as cooking, cleaning, and kin 
care, has historically been divided along gender and racial lines. Women of color have a history 
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of being confined to the service sector, first in the homes of wealthy whites, and now in 
institutional settings in the public sphere (Duffy 2007). The changing needs of the capitalist 
market motivated this change, demonstrating how capitalist forces have varying effects 
depending on a woman’s intersecting identities (Glenn 1992).  
Many states have historically used welfare as a tool to maintain this systemic 
confinement of women of color to the service sector (Boling 2015). Current examples suggest 
that this historic trend has continued to today. Bowie and Dopwell (2013) argue that TANF 
overlooks and disregards the various metastressors women in poverty, specifically women of 
color in poverty, face. The harsh time limits, penalties, and emphasis on a work first ideology 
compound the already intense life stressors – such as physical/mental health issues, housing 
issues, and interpersonal violence – many of these women face, making it even more difficult for 
them to rise out of poverty (Bowie and Dopwell 2013). This is evidenced by the data that shows 
that TANF recipients disproportionately work in low-wage, unstable, and temporary jobs, and 
recidivism is worse for black welfare leavers than for whites (Banerjee and Ridzi 2008). Women 
of color are compelled to comply with TANF guidelines by the harsh penalties and find 
themselves in low-wage jobs that don’t cover basic financial needs and have little or no options 
for advancement (Banerjee and Ridzi 2008). As one woman put it, “It’s creating a workforce of 
slave laborers” (qtd. in Banerjee and Ridzi 2008 p. 106).  
This process involves “encouraging” women in poverty to avoid abortion. Hussey (2010, 
2011) found that welfare recipients were less likely to utilize abortion services in pro-life states. 
This was evident independently from other factors which might influence the abortion decision, 
such as women’s sensitivity to the cost of abortion (Hussey 2011). This suggests that pro-life 
state legislators promote childbirth and discourage abortion indirectly via non-abortion related 
41 
 
state programs such as welfare. Women with children are then eligible for TANF, since TANF is 
in general only available for parents. Thus, pro-life states that encourage women of color in 
poverty to have children are effectively funneling these women into jobs with no upward 
mobility through participation in TANF. I argue that this is exploitative and oppressive because 
it uses minority women for their labor while keeping them trapped in poverty with few routes to 
upward mobility. 
This chapter expands the current discussion surrounding abortion access by arguing that 
reduced access to abortion is oppressive rather than simply coincidental or even discriminatory. I 
make three major claims which suggest that the effects of reduced access to abortion for low-
income women and women of color are oppressive. First, I argue that the anti-abortion 
movement and anti-abortion ideology and legislation support current systems of oppression, 
namely, the war on drugs and militaristic immigration enforcement. Second, I argue that reduced 
access to abortion and birth control contribute to higher rates of sterilization and sterilization 
regret in minority populations. Finally, I argue that welfare in pro-life states encourages 
childbirth and thus participation in family welfare that is exploitative and oppressive. All three of 
these claims involve women of color and low-income women, and thus argue that the form of 
reproductive oppression described is racialized and classed. In other words, reduced access to 
abortion is specifically oppressive to minority women.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
I argue that reduced access to abortion is oppressive to women of color and low-income 
women. There is an extensive line of feminist research where scholars argue that anti-abortion 
legislation disproportionately affects minority women. I expand on this by arguing that this 
disproportionate effect functions as a site of oppression for minority women and low-income 
women. I examine historical and contemporary connections to supposedly unrelated oppressive 
systems, rates of sterilization and sterilization regret, and exploitative family welfare as major 
sites where reduced access to abortion functions as oppression. Recognizing that this is a 
controversial topic, I use this concluding chapter to discuss one main objection to the argument I 
present in this thesis. Simply explicating another site of oppression for minority women and low-
income women does little to resolve the issues these women face. Highlighting avenues for 
improving the condition of disadvantaged groups is a key component to intersectionality so I 
conclude this chapter with theories of resistance through marginality, and examples of effective, 
contemporary resistance to reduced access to abortion.  
 
 
Addressing a Concern… 
 
One could object to my argument that reduced access to abortion is oppressive to low-
income women and women of color by pointing to the history of birth control in the US. 
Margaret Sanger, an early birth control activist and founder of what would eventually become 
Planned Parenthood, popularized the term “birth control”. She espoused views that closely 
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aligned with the eugenics movement of her time, arguing for birth control as a method to rid the 
world of “human weeds [who] clog up the path, [and] drain up the energies and the resources of 
this little earth” (qtd. in Sanger 2007). This, combined with the historic suppression of women of 
color and low-income women’s reproduction (see Chapter 3), could lead one to argue that 
increasing access to abortion for minority women would be just another effort to eliminate 
minority people. In other words, one could object to my thesis by arguing that abortion is just 
another form of racist population control. 
 However, improving access to abortion is not the same thing as coercing women into 
getting abortions. While it is important to avoid eugenic notions and misguided population 
control policies, reducing access to abortion does not help in that endeavor. Quite the opposite, I 
argue that attempts to control women’s reproduction and reproductive labor motivate anti-
abortion policies. For example, politicians have used xenophobic and racist fears about white 
women reproducing less than women of color to support their arguments against abortion access 
(Dubow 2011). This argument also ignores women of color’s reproductive autonomy and ability 
to make responsible reproductive choices for themselves. Women of color have been and 
continue to be important contributors to reproductive justice movements that include and 
highlight abortion access (Ross 1998). Access to a full range of reproductive options afford 
women true reproductive freedom that is not coerced – conversely, removing access in a 
misguided attempt to “save” women of color from population control is paternalistic and does 
more harm than good. 
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Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
 I conclude this thesis, which focuses so heavily on oppression, with a brief theoretical 
framework for resistance and some practical examples of resistance. I rely heavily on a Marxist 
theory of oppression and feminist theories of oppression and privilege that stem from Marilyn 
Frye’s The Politics of Reality (1983). A critique of these frameworks is that they are 
“discouraging [and] demoralizing” (Lugones 1990 p. 502) because they are not liberating. To 
remedy this, Lugones (1990) proposes a theoretical framework that positions oppressed 
individuals, those who feel their intersecting identities most viscerally, as most capable of 
liberation. Their positions in the liminal spaces of society and their ability to cross back and forth 
between being both oppressor and oppressed, grant them epistemological insight into structures 
of power (Lugones 1990). This insight aids in collective struggle and can result in imaginative 
solutions to complex problems.  
 It is important to note that women of color and women in states that are hostile to 
abortion are frequently central actors in reproductive justice advocacy. Despite the oppression 
they face, we should take care not to view women of color as passive (Roberts 1999). To this 
point, I conclude with a discussion of several contemporary organizations and their efforts at 
reducing the reproductive oppression disadvantaged women face. “SisterSong” is a coalitional 
education and awareness organization that focuses on reproductive justice issues for women of 
color. They have headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, a long-time anti-abortion state. They formed 
in 1997 when 16 smaller organizations for Native American, African American, Latina, and 
Asian American women joined forces. They take a broad view of reproductive justice and focus 
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on issues most pertinent to women of color, including but not limited to abortion access 
(SisterSong 2019).  
Choices Memphis Center for Reproductive Rights is more narrowly focused on issues of 
abortion, but also centers its work on the needs of underserved populations, specifically women 
of color and low-income women. Choices is an abortion clinic in Tennessee that aims to avoid 
getting shut down by TRAP laws by diversifying their services. By providing services such as 
transgender healthcare, adoption referrals, and midwifery care and births along with abortion 
they hope to avoid shutting down completely when adjusting to new TRAP laws. These 
additional services ensure a revenue stream during adjustment periods which allows the clinic to 
continue providing reproductive healthcare and restart abortion services more quickly than at 
clinics that focus simply on abortion (Memphis Choices 2019). These two examples demonstrate 
how women at the margins use their place of liminality and epistemological insight to come up 
with creative solutions and resistance methods to anti-abortion measures.  
This thesis argues that reduced access to abortion functions as reproductive oppression 
for women of color and low-income women, however I acknowledge certain objections. Along 
those lines, I address some misleading ideas about increased abortion access as a site of 
oppression. These ideas hide the important contributions of women of color in the fight for 
abortion and general reproductive justice. I also discuss a theory of oppression and marginality 
as places for resistance; all too often, theories of oppression fail to provide a way to improve the 
experiences of the oppressed and, thus, can be disempowering. The organizations working for 
reproductive justice from places of marginality that I discuss in this chapter offer promising 
avenues for using creative strategies to address the reproductive oppression minority women and 
low-income women face. Despite the oppression they face, it is my hope that new strategies can 
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develop to assist minority women and low-income women in the fight for, and ultimately the 
attainment of, reproductive justice.  
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